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Abstract: The availability and quality of basic public services are important determinants 
of urban quality of life. In many cities, rapid population growth and fiscal constraints are 
limiting the extent to which urban governments can keep up with increasing demand for 
these services. It therefore becomes important to prioritize provision of those services to 
best reflect local demand. We present a strategy to estimate the demand for public 
services, which is sensitive to heterogeneity in preferences across types of households, 
and the nonparametric estimation addresses problems arising from functional form 
restrictions. Using data from Pune, India, we estimate the demand for public services, as 
represented by the marginal change in the self-assessed monthly rental price of dwellings 
from the services. We find that the value of publicly provided services accruing to the 
poor is greater than that going to wealthier households, and even untargeted across-the-
board investment in specific services can be progressive.  
 
JEL: H40; R21 
 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3924, May 2006 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, 
even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should 
be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, 
or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. 
                                                 
∗ This paper is part of a larger effort to understand the contribution of urban public services to household 
welfare and overall quality of life. The research and data collection has been co-funded by a World Bank 
research grant on “Strengthening Fiscal Capacity of Indian Cities” and the UK DFID’s Urban Knowledge 




















































































































1  Introduction: what are public services worth? 
 
The provision of public goods and services is the major function of governments, and 
governments have traditionally been the major providers and financers of services.  
Governments, particularly in developing countries are facing increased demand for 
services and greater responsibilities in the face of more rising financial constraints.  This 
compels policymakers to set priorities, and to enhance the efficiency of service delivery.  
The World Development Report of 2004 (World Bank 2004) focused on the efficiency 
and management of public service delivery, emphasizing the importance of 
accountability and outcomes.  That report provided new insights on the supply side; that 
is, how governments can improve service delivery.  The demand side however has 
received less attention.  One of main objectives in this paper is to examine the demand 
for services – the motivation comes from two disparate fields: first, the estimation of 
explicit reduced-form demand functions or demand systems, in which the quantity 
consumed is determined by prices and incomes; second, the work on capitalization and 
hedonic estimation of house prices. 
We use a variant of the hedonic method to estimate the private returns to public 
services.  That is, we estimate the change in house prices resulting from the provision of 
selected public services.  This is implicitly a measure of the household’s own subjective 
estimate of the value of public services.  This paper focuses exclusively on the private 
value of public services.
1  The services that we examine here are those that are important 
for improving a household’s quality of life. These include access to piped water supply 
and sanitation, solid waste management, basic transport services, education, and crime 
                                                 
1 We can’t estimate the public value – the externalities – explicitly.     3
prevention. Although the private willingness to pay may be an underestimate of the social 
benefits of improved service delivery,
2 we believe that there will be many cases where 
the level of public service delivery is inadequate to meet even the private valuation of the 
benefits of improvements.  Households may be willing to pay for improvements, but for a 
variety of reasons (coordination failure on both the demand and supply sides, institutional 




It is well accepted that the distribution of public services is inequitable.  The 2004 
World Development Report reports that the poorest fifth of the population generally 
receives less than a fifth of public service expenditures, while the richest fifth receives 
more than one fifth of expenditure (World Bank 2004).  In this view, the distribution of 
public services is inequitable because the value of public services provided to the wealthy 
is greater than the value of services provided to the poor.  This claim is unarguable – if a 
public goal is to provide education, it is difficult to claim a priori that educating the 
wealthy is more expensive than educating the poor, to the same standard.  But this view 
of distribution conflicts with a slightly different conception, in which distribution is 
defined relative to a particular index. This leads to the measurement of the concentration 
of the value of services at various points of (e.g.) the income distribution; and distribution 
of a good or service is considered progressive if it is more equitable than the prevailing 
distribution of income.  
In this paper, we recover household-specific contribution of public services and 
other characteristics to the self-assessed rental price of a dwelling unit.  We can then 
                                                 
2 Availability of these services are likely to generate significant positive externalities.   4
correlate these estimated values with a range of household characteristics, to understand 
how different households value different services.  We can also use these results to 
compare the values of certain public services across households.  Households can be 
ranked, for instance, by the self-reported rental values of their dwellings, and we can 
compare the distribution of various public services to the underlying distribution of 
housing capital.  We find that although the wealthy certainly receive more of these public 
services, by value, the services accruing to the poorest is higher, when expressed as a 
share of the rental value of the dwelling unit.   
 
Valuing Public Services in Indian Cities 
With institutional and regulatory reforms emanating from the 74
th Constitutional 
Amendment Act (CAA 1992), more administrative and fiscal functions have been 
devolved to local authorities in India.
3 Cities are now responsible for designing strategies 
to maintain and improve public services, and finding instruments to finance these 
activities in a sustainable manner.
4 While supply side responses based on preset norms 
and standards are useful in setting priorities in terms of service provision, it is equally 
important to examine what services are demanded by local residents, as well as evaluate 
how they vary across different types of households, particularly the poor. In fact in 
December 2005, the Prime Minster launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban 
Renewal Mission (JNNURM) to improve the contribution of cities to India’s economic 
                                                 
3 Mandatory provisions for devolution of fiscal and financial responsibilities and powers to city 
governments have been operational for more than a decade. 
4 In the decade since passage of these amendments, however, the effectiveness of decentralization has been 
limited, with slow and uneven progress across states.  While the CAA envisioned decentralization of 
functions, finances and functionaries to enable Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) to function as “institutions of 
self government,” in reality, fiscal and administrative decentralization have lagged behind political 
decentralization.   5
development. One of the explicit objectives of the JNNURM is to ensure basic services to 
the urban poor, and an important strategy to do this would be to integrate the poor with 
service delivery systems. Presumably, these improvements are likely to improve the 
welfare of poor households.  
However at this stage it is unclear what (package of) services are demanded by 
poor households, and whether pro-poor improvements should be targeted in the form of 
cash transfers / subsidies or if citywide improvements in services and public goods (such 
as extending water and sewer networks, reduction in crime and air pollution) are likely to 
accrue disproportionate benefits to poor households. In this paper, we outline a general 
methodology to assess the value of public services and apply this to examine demand for 
public services in the Indian city of Pune. While the empirical application focuses on 
household data collected for Pune, the estimation strategy outlined in the paper has 
broader applicability and can be used to examine similar issues across cities.  
Our main finding is that the value of publicly-provided services accruing to the 
poor is greater than that going to wealthier households.
5  The services examined (water, 
transport, education, safety) are worth roughly 29 percent of the rental value of the 
dwelling among the wealthy, but 67 percent of the rental value among the poor.  The list 
of services examined in our analysis is clearly not comprehensive – wealthier households 
may benefit from different public services that we have not included.  But the results 
suggest that even untargeted, across-the-board investment in these services can be 
progressive.  
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. In Section 2, we 
discuss the role of hedonic models in estimating the net benefits from local property taxes   6
and public services. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 discusses our model. And 
estimation strategy, Section 5 provides the main findings and Section 6 concludes.    
 
2.  Hedonics, property taxes, and public services 
Hedonic estimation is based on the principle that goods can be described as a 
bundle of attributes and the value of a good is a combination of the values of these 
attributes (Lancaster 1966; Rosen 1974). This implies that the value of a dwelling unit is 
a function of the value of its physical characteristics (such as size), as well as the 
characteristics of its neighborhood and the services and amenities available in the area.  
By extension, the present value of a dwelling is the discounted stream of future net 
benefits that are expected to accrue to the occupant or owner.   
The idea that the present value of a dwelling is the sum of benefits derived from it 
is formally described as capitalization.  This has been used extensively to study variation 
in housing prices and location decisions.  For example, the bid-rent models of Alonso 
(1964), Muth (1969) and others were based on the observation that land values decline 
with distance from (monocentric) city centers, as the cost of commuting increases, and 
that this variation is reflected in the price of housing.   
In hedonic models, households choose dwellings as different bundles of 
amenities.  In Tiebout’s (1956) original paper, households vote with their feet, sorting 
into communities based on their preferred levels of public good provision.  Tiebout found 
that local jurisdictions compete with each other to attract residents on the basis of service 
provision.  Tiebout’s model did not include property taxes; Oates (1969) expanded the 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Values are expressed in terms of the price of housing or income.   7
model to include tax payments, to test the hypothesis that households choose locations 
based on the combinations of taxes and services. 
In this “benefit view” of local tax and service, the value of public services (and 
concomitant taxes) is capitalized into the price of housing.  In equilibrium, the additional 
value of public services in housing is zero: services are exactly offset by taxes.  The value 
added by public services to the price of housing is net of property taxes paid.  Thus, in 
principle, the value added from public services is a transfer from the public sector to the 
property owner or resident.  This value added can in principle be extracted from the 
household in local taxes, and jurisdictions choose the combination of taxes and services 
to attract and retain residents.  
Fischel (2000) presents a more modern variant of the Tiebout model, in which the 
median voter (the “homevoter”) will elect a local government that provides the optimum 
combination of local taxes and services to maximize local property values.  The 
government’s objective includes the desire to remain in office and the need to prevent 
households from migrating to other districts.   
Tiebout’s model and its successors are partly based on the assumption that the 
supply of housing is fixed, at least in the short run.   If not, increased demand due to 
preferable bundles of services in certain areas would engender a supply response, bidding 
down property values.   
This importance of this assumption is minimized, but not altogether eliminated, in 
the “new view” of local taxation, which allows the stock of residential capital to move (or 
rather to be converted to other uses).  In this view, increased taxes will encourage the 
capital stock to move.  The two views are not necessarily contradictory.  In the short run,   8
residential capital is more or less immobile.  In the medium and long run, taxes may 
prompt capital to move, as well as residents. 
The question remains whether property taxes are a fee for public services (in the 
benefit view) or a distorting tax on capital (in the new view).  In principle, the former 
model predicts that higher taxes will lead to increased property values; whereas in the 
latter, higher taxes lead to a fall in property values.  But the distinction is not so clear.  
Oates (1969) argues that an increase in taxes without a commensurate increase in services 
leads to a decline in property values, but if accompanied by an increase in local 
expenditures, then a tax increase might lead to an increase in property values. 
Research has consistently shown that capitalization does occur.  But not all local 
expenditure and taxes are capitalized into property values, and the elasticity of 
capitalization is generally less than one – that is, a one percent increase in local 
expenditure yields a less-than-one percent increase in property prices.  This may be 
because the increases are transitory, or that it is the rate of change in local services that 
matter, rather than levels.  In addition, local public services are by definition (or at least 
by assumption) public goods, with significant externalities.  The benefits from these 
public goods can accrue to those who pay neither taxes nor rents, and perhaps even to 
those who do not reside in the jurisdiction.   
In addition to the costs and benefits of commuting and public services, individuals 
have preferences over community composition.  This is most famously articulated in the 
works of Thomas Schelling (1969, 1971, 1978) whose models of social interaction show 
that microeconomic forces such as discriminatory individual preferences or behavior lead 
to aggregate phenomena such as sorting and segregation.  This model implies that people   9
are willing to pay differential premiums to live near others who share common socio-
economic or demographic characteristics.  These characteristics include religion, class, 
language, educational attainment, and duration of stay and tenure in the city.   
 
3. Data   
Our data come from Pune, a city located in the State of Maharashtra, 
approximately 200 kilometers east of Mumbai.  Pune has a population of 2.8 million, of 
whom close to one million live in slum settlements distributed throughout the city (Bapat 
and Agarwal 2003).  The empirical analysis draws on a household survey which was 
collected between August and October 2002, and designed to be representative of the 
Pune Municipal Corporation area.  All households of the city are part of the sampling 
universe, with the exception of residents of military cantonments and institutional 
populations (e.g. prisons). The sample was chosen to be representative of each of the 48 
wards (administrative units) in proportion to the preliminary estimates of the Census of 
March 2001.   For our survey, 2850 households were randomly selected and asked 
questions regarding socioeconomic characteristics, quality and quantity of housing, 
tenure status, and access to infrastructure services.  Non-response and other missing data 
problems reduce the size of the dataset for analysis to 2703 households.   
The value of the dwelling unit is the household’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a 
set of dwelling unit and neighborhood characteristics.  The survey asked each household 
the following questions: “What would be the estimated present market price for a similar 
unit in this neighborhood?” and “What would be the estimated monthly rental value for a 
similar unit in this neighborhood?”  We use the latter measure in the empirical work   10
below.  A summary of self-assessed monthly rents is provided in Appendix Table 1A and 
1B, as well as the dwelling-unit and household characteristics used in the estimation.  
We distinguish three types of characteristics that can influence the self-assessed 
value of housing.  First are the attributes of the dwelling unit itself.  These include mains 
water and sewer, the distance to the nearest bus stop, whether the dwelling is detached or 
attached (relative to apartment), living space, whether the dwelling has a good roof and 
good exterior, and whether the dwelling is in a slum.   
Second, we include a set of variables describing the characteristics of the 
neighborhood.  These are mostly defined as the characteristics of the nearest 25 sample 
neighbors, and include the share of detached houses, the share of attached houses, mean 
living space, the share with good roof and good exterior, the share of neighbors in slums, 
the number of parks and schools within 1 km, and the mean effective property tax rate of 
neighbors.
6  We also include a measure of housing density – the number of dwellings in 
the ward – as a measure of the supply constraints in the housing market.  The tax- and 
service-capitalization models assume that zoning and other restrictions constrain the 
supply of housing, forcing residents to move in response to changes in policy.  The 
incentive to move, and indeed the incentive for jurisdictions to compete, is diminished 
with more elastic supply.   
Finally, we include a set of variables describing the characteristics of the 
neighbors.  These are also defined for each dwelling as the mean values of the nearest 25 
neighbors, and include the share who are scheduled caste, mean years of residence, the 
share of household heads with higher education, mean income from durables and the 
                                                 
6 This is the actual tax paid, plus other (unspecified) fees, as a percentage of the stated value of the 
dwelling, including those who report paying no taxes; not the official tax rate.   11
mean log deviation of durables income, the share of neighbors who own their residence, 
the share who feel the neighborhood is safe, the share who feel roads are dangerous, and 
the share who feel air is severely polluted.   
Each of these categories contains a subset of variables that indicate the provision 
of public services.  Of the dwelling unit characteristics, mains water and sewer, and the 
distance to the nearest bus stop, are amenable to policy; whereas the others reflect 
decisions either of builders or the households themselves.  While every household in the 
city gets access to water using alternate sources, we focus on the capitalization effects of 
networked or piped water supply. In Pune, the municipal corporation (PMC) is 
responsible for providing water within the city limits. Our survey data however suggest 
that piped or networked supply coverage is not universal. Only 55 percent of surveyed 
households report receiving piped water directly from the PMC water network. Another 
21 percent receive piped water by (illegally) sub connecting to households who have 
official access to the piped network. Other water sources include private mini water 
systems, handpumps, tubewells, community taps, and water tankers. Given the 
considerable variation in access to water, having a piped or network connection should 
make the dwelling unit more attractive than comparable units without piped access.  
Of the neighborhood variables, the variables that reflect policy are the number of 
parks and schools within 1 km, and the mean property tax rate of neighbors.  We include 
the opinions of neighbors to crime, road safety, and air pollution as indicators of policy.  
While these attitudes may not accurately reflect the actual state of crime, road safety and 
pollution, it is plausible that house prices are more likely to reflect attitudes rather than 
statistics.  These attitudes are likely formed by a combination of the municipal   12
government’s actions to alleviate these problems, as well as the public information 
campaigns to assuage the fears of residents.   
In our estimation, we include both renters and owners, since they will both benefit 
from public services, and since the value of public services may be capitalized in the 
rental value of property as well.  Owners and renters can both value schools and 
hospitals.  Similarly, we use the mean tax payments (including zeros) of all households in 
a neighborhood, rather than dwelling-specific payments.  To the extent to which local 
services are directly supported by local tax payments, the taxes paid by neighbors have 
significant external effects.  This minimizes the impact of measurement error in reported 
tax payments, and allows us to include renters as well as owners in the sample.
7   
One of our goals in this paper is to understand the variance in the demand for and 
willingness-to-pay for certain public services.  We expect that demand for various 
housing and neighborhood attributes is significantly heterogeneous: it varies 
systematically with household characteristics.  We estimate differences in the value of 
housing characteristics as a function of a set of household characteristics, including the 
age and education of the household head, whether the household head was born in Pune, 
whether the household is scheduled caste (a marginalized category in the social system), 
the number of years the household has lived in its current dwelling, the household’s 
income from durable goods, and whether the household owns the dwelling.  This allows 
us to estimate the value of different public services across groups of households.   
 
                                                 
7 We ignore the taxes passed through to renters by property owners in the form of higher rents.     13
4.  Model and Estimation Strategy 
The simple hedonic method discussed above is a reduced form.  Under certain maintained 
hypotheses (such as perfectly elastic supply), single-equation hedonic parameter 
estimates can have a structural interpretation.  But these assumptions are generally 
untenable (Malpezzi 2002).
8  This has led researchers to develop two-stage models, in 
which the second stage is an attempt to recover structural demand parameters for 
individual housing characteristics.  The second stage is usually estimated independently 
for individual dwelling unit characteristics, such as living space, as functions of demand 
shifters such as household characteristics. 
Malpezzi (2002) points out the key role of functional form in estimating hedonic 
equations; most two-stage hedonic estimators are in fact identified by the assumptions 
implicit in choice of functional form – for example by the differences between 
logarithmic first-stage and linear second-stage regressions.  The obtained estimates are 
thus reliant on the choice of functional forms.   
In this paper we use a variant of the three-stage method of Bajari and Kahn (2003) 
to recover structural demand parameters, and explain these tastes as functions of 
household characteristics.  We avoid the problems of functional form in two ways.  First, 
we estimate a nonparametric first stage, using general additive modelling techniques.  
Second, we bootstrap, so that the final reported estimates are the result of 250 repetitions 
of the method.  
                                                 
8 Chay and Greenstone (2005) review econometric problems in hedonic models, and they suggest that in 
single equation cross-section models, misspecification frequently occurs which leads to inconsistent 
estimates of hedonic prices and thus inconsistent marginal willingness to pay estimates. Omitted variables 
may bias estimates if there are unobserved factors that vary, for both with housing prices and service levels. 
This may be less of a problem where rich information is available at the individual observation level, 
compared to applications such as Chay and Greenstone (2005) that use a very limited set of highly 
aggregated variables.   14
( ) c x u u j j ij , ,η =
Following Bajari and Kahn, we assume that the household gets utility from 
consumption of housing and other goods and services: 
   (1) 
where uij = utility of household i from good j; xj = observed characteristic of good j;  ηj = 
unobserved characteristic of good j; c = Hicksian composite good, with price normalized 
to one.  Price is a function of observed and unobserved characteristics                          .   
Letting yi = income, and substituting for                           , we can solve for the 






In other words, the marginal rate of substitution between a (continuous) 
characteristic and the composite c is the partial derivative of the hedonic.  Following 
Bajari and Kahn (2003) and Bajari and Benkard (2002), we place some restrictions on the 
utility function for identification of the derivative 
(3) 
so that we can recover the utility function parameters β: 
 
(4) 
where                      is estimated by the first-stage hedonic. 
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In the third stage, we allow the housing demand parameters to be heterogeneous, 
such that  
(5) 
where zi is a vector of demand-shifting household characteristics. 
4.1 Estimation  strategy 
Following Bajari and Kahn (2003), our estimation proceeds in three steps.  First, 
we estimate the non-parametric hedonic function.  Second, we recover the structural 
demand parameters using the first-order conditions described in (2).  Third, we estimate 
the determinants of these demand parameters on a vector of household characteristics.  
We depart from Bajari and Kahn in two main ways: we employ a different method for the 
estimation of the hedonic, and primarily to ensure robustness, we bootstrap each stage 
250 times. 
Nonparametric hedonic estimation 
As Malpezzi (2002) and others have mentioned, hedonic estimates have been 
driven by functional form assumptions.  The “wrong” functional form can have terrible 
consequences for traditional estimators (Pace 1998).  In response, researchers have tried a 
variety of nonparametric and semiparametric methods (see Pace 1995, 1998 for 
nonparametric estimation; Anglin and Gencay 1993 for semiparametric estimation), 
which have been shown to outperform OLS estimators.   
Nonparametric estimation is also useful when the partial relationship between the 
regressors and the dependent variable is significantly nonlinear.  If the nonlinearity is 
simple and monotone, the variables may be transformed, for example by using logs, 
( ) ik i k ik z f ε β + =  16
powers, or polynomials.  But some of these transformations (such as the flexible 
TransLog), are undefined if attributes take zero values.
9 
Nonparametric methods are preferable to ad hoc methods for addressing 
nonlinearity, but the most commonly used nonparametric methods present a different set 
of problems.  Locally weighted regressions depend to a large degree on the smoothing 
parameter (the kernel) and the bandwidth.  There is no robust method for choosing these 
values a priori; the choice is often based on visual inspection of the data and the results.  
When extended to the multivariate case, local multivariate regressions quickly suffer the 
“curse of dimensionality:” as the number of regressors increases, the number of 
observations in each multidimensional neighborhood gets smaller.  The solution is to 
increase the size of the span or window to capture more observations, but doing so 
quickly makes the regression less local, and the bias due to unspecified nonlinearity 
quickly returns.    
The general additive regression models (GAM) overcome the problem of 
dimensionality by applying local regression to low dimensional projections of the data 
(Hastie and Tibshirani (1995).  The GAM can be described as  
(6) 
where the functions f(.) are determined empirically.
10  The model is solved by 
“backfitting” and iteratively reweighted least squares, minimizing the sum of squared 
errors from (6) until convergence.  The data are first recast in deviations from the mean, 
so that the partial regressions sum to zero.  We obtain preliminary estimates from an OLS 
regression of y on x, and then compute the partial residuals for each xm which are 
                                                 
9 Taking the log of a variable after adding one causes little trouble if the values are “large”, but causes 
problems if the variable is small, such as a proportion (bounded by zero and one). 
() ( ) ( ) i i i i x f x f y E ε α + + + + = ... 2 2 1 1  17
orthogonal to the expectation of y given x∀n≠m (see Hastie and Tibshirani 1990, Andersen 
2004 for detailed explanations).  The GAM essentially reduces the problem of estimating 
nonparametric regressions to a sequence of bivariate smoothing problems.  This also 
allows us to make simple plots showing the bivariate partial relationships between each 
xm and y.  These are presented as Appendix Figures A1-A21. 
Pace (1998) presents GAM estimates of prices and housing characteristics on a 
sample of 442 houses with transactions data from Memphis, Tennessee.  He finds that the 
GAM estimator consistently outperforms the OLS estimator in a variety of functional 
forms, obtaining a better overall fit and much less bias.  The purpose of that paper is 
primarily to compare results across estimators, and does not attempt to derive structural 
demand parameters.  Although we share the same first-stage estimation method as Pace, 
this paper is closer in spirit to that of Bajari and Kahn (2003).   
Recovering structural parameters 
The restrictions placed on the utility function (3) allow us to obtain closed-form 
solutions to for the first order conditions (4) for continuous variables.  Our model of 
housing demand includes both continuous and categorical variables, and the derivation 
method must account for this distinction.  For continuous characteristics, we follow 
Bajari and Kahn, and define the derivative as 
(7) 
where                           .  In this way, the value of the characteristic is allowed to vary 
across households.  For dichotomous characteristics, we must use a different method.  As 
Bajari and Kahn point out, for dichotomous variables, there will be no first-order 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Note that the linear (OLS) regression is a case of GAM with infinite smoothing. 















condition.  Instead, utility maximization implies a threshold decision rule.  Households 
for which the price of a dichotomous characteristic exceeds the utility derived from 
having it will choose not to have it; and those in which the utility exceeds the price will 
choose to have it.  We derive the implicit value of the dichotomous characteristics using 
Kennedy’s approximation: 
(8) 
where            is an estimate of the variance of    .   
Heterogeneity of tastes and demand 
In the third stage, we regress the derived structural demand parameters against a 
vector of household characteristics.  Here we follow Bajari and Kahn (2003), estimating 
demand (willingness to pay) for continuous variables as OLS, and for dichotomous 
characteristics as maximum likelihood probit, normalizing the coefficient on price equal 
to -1.   
 
5. Main  Findings 
Stage 1 and 2 results 
Here we discuss the results of each stage in turn.  First, we highlight two of the 
smoothed partial plots derived from the GAM hedonic regression, to show that the 
relationship between some of the variables of interest and monthly rent is neither simple 
nor monotonic.  For example, Figures 1A and 1B show the partial residual plot of the 
distance to the nearest bus stop and the number of schools, respectively.  These figures 
show considerable nonlinearity in the relationship between these services and rent.  
Holding other characteristics constant, households that live closer to bus stops are willing 
() k V γˆ ˆ γˆ
( ) 1 ˆ ˆ
2
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to pay more (relative to the mean) for their dwellings, and households that live further 
away are willing to pay less.  Dwellings with access to more schools command a 
significantly higher price than those with fewer schools.  
Table 1 presents selected results from the GAM estimation, including only those 
variables that explicitly represent public services.
11  Results for the extended set of 
variables used in the estimation are reported in Appendix Tables 1B and 2. In terms of 
the implicit values, the dwelling unit’s living space and having a good exterior add the 
most to the rental value of a property.  
Our discussion however focuses on public services and local amenities, which are 
reported in Table 1. This table shows that on average, a few public services are 
significantly capitalized into the rental price of the property.  A connection to the mains 
water supply adds 160 Rupees, or about 14 percent, to the rental value of a property.  On 
average, access to schools is worth about 120 Rupees, or about 10 percent, to the rent.  
None of the neighbor characteristics is significant, on average.   
It is important to note here that the fact that these estimates are insignificant on 
average does not mean that they are insignificant to all households.  Even without 
considering taste shifters and other covariates, a quick glance at Figures 1A and 1B 
reveals that public transport and the availability of schools matters more to some 
households than others.  Households differ considerably in their subjective evaluation of 
these characteristics, as the next section will show.   
Table 1 also presents a measure of the “gain” from the nonlinear estimation 
method.  Hastie and Tibshirani (1995) consider this a relatively imprecise measure of the 
value of the GAM estimates, but we can have some confidence in the result, since it is   20
derived from the bootstrapped estimates.  This is a chi-square approximation to the 
distribution of the gain relative to the linear marginal relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, and is rejected in 100 percent of the bootstrapped 




In order to understand the diverse preferences for dwelling unit attributes, we 
regress the structural utility estimates derived using the first-order conditions in (7) and 
(8) on a range of household characteristics.  For the dichotomous variables, we follow 
Bajari and Kahn and estimate a probit regression on a dummy variable indicating 
possession of the attribute, while constraining the parameter on the price (obtained in the 
GAM) to –1.  For the continuous variables, we run simple linear regressions on the rental 
value of an improvement in the attribute of one-half of one standard deviation around the 
mean.   Table 2 shows the magnitudes of these changes.  For the dichotomous attributes 
(mains water, sewer), the value of the improvement is clearly 100 percent of the value of 
the attribute.  For the continuous variables, the simulated changes range from a seven 
percent improvement (ie a decline) in the share of neighbors who feel air is severely 
polluted, to a 100 percent increase in the number of parks within one kilometer.  The 
range is large, since the changes are defined by the distribution of the underlying 
variables. 
Other things being equal, the value of the tax in the price of housing is an 
indicator of the net benefit of local taxes and services to the local residents.  A negative 
value would indicate that the net benefit of the tax and local services is negative; the tax 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 These are the means of the bootstrapped parameter estimates and variances.   21
is considered a burden, and lowers the value of a property, in principle to the extent of the 
present value of the discounted stream of anticipated tax payments.  If the value of the tax 
payment is positive, it suggests that households value the local services provided by the 
municipal government, and possibly that the household understands that the provision of 
local services is somehow connected to the payment of local taxes.   
The results in Table 2 provide prima facie support for the benefit view of local 
taxes.  A 40 percent increase in the tax rate will on average increase the rental value of 
the property by 11 Rupees, or about 1.3 percent.  The median house price in Pune is 
Rs.200,000, and the median rent is Rs.1000, implying a roughly 5 or 6 percent annual 
return on investment,
 12 which is considerably lower than current (July 2005) Indian 
mortgage interest rates of around 10 percent.  The mean tax rate is 0.7 percent of the 
purchase price.  At a discount rate of 5 percent, the net present value of tax payments is 
about 1.2 percent of the purchase price, implying an elasticity of house prices with 
respect to taxes of about 1.5.  At a ten percent discount rate, the elasticity of house prices 
to tax rates is about 0.8.  These are rather high tax capitalization rates, relative to those 
found in the US, of around 0.6.  Even so, these estimates support the view that on 
average, households value the benefits they receive in return for payment of local taxes. 
These averages mask significant variation across households.  In the third stage, 
we regress the individual willingness-to-pay measures derived from the GAM results on a 
parsimonious set of household characteristics.  Selected results from these regressions are 
presented in Tables 3.1 to 3.3.   
Table 3.1 presents the results for dwelling unit attributes.  In all cases, the value of 
services varies across wealth: wealthier households will pay more for services than   22
poorer households.  But other characteristics matter, as well.  On average, the value of a 
mains water connection adds 160 Rupees to the monthly rent of a dwelling.  Among 
scheduled caste households (holding other household characteristics constant), the value 
of the mains water connection is about ten Rupees less than average.  The scheduled-
caste household is still willing to pay for the mains connection, but it will not pay as 
much as an average household for the service.  Households with older heads will pay 
more, as will households that are native to Pune, and households that have been resident 
longer in their dwellings will also pay more for mains water.  Consistent with the 
predictions of capitalization, owners will pay about 50 percent more than average for 
mains water connection.    
Connection to the sewer is worth significantly less on average than mains water 
connection.
13  Sewer connections are relatively more valuable to households with 
educated heads, and to those native to Pune.  Surprisingly, owners of dwellings value 
sewer connections less than renters.    
The simulation on the nearest bus stop is expressed as a decrease in the distance 
(a good) so that we can examine the household’s positive willingness to pay.  On 
average, a 40 percent decrease in the distance to the bus stop is worth about 23 Rupees 
per month.  To scheduled-caste households, this improvement may be worth only 17 
Rupees (though the parameter estimate in the third stage is not significant).  To 
households with educated heads, the improvement is worth 50 Rupees.  Owners and 
wealthier households are also willing to pay more for a decrease in the distance to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Net of transactions costs, and assuming house prices do not change. 
13 This lower estimate of the benefits to sewers is not due to correlation between mains water and sewer.  
Although households with one are more likely to have the other, the simple correlation between them is 
0.1.   23
bus.  Note that this does not imply that the wealthy are more likely to use public 
transport.   
Table 3.2 looks at the value in terms of monthly rent of changes in neighborhood 
attributes.  The mean results showed that on average, monthly rents were unrelated to the 
number of parks within one kilometer.  This holds true for different types of households, 
as well.  The second column examines differences in the value of access to schools.  This 
is a measure of all facilities, regardless of level or management (i.e., it is the count of all 
schools, public and private, primary schools to technical colleges).  On average, the 
number of schools is worth 120 Rupees per month.  Among scheduled caste households, 
access to schools is worth 85 Rupees.  However, we find that households with more-
educated heads value schools much more than average – among these households, access 
to schools is worth 205 Rupees per month. Similarly, households with older heads value 
schools more than average, but not by much.  
The final column in Table 3.2 looks at the value of tax rates, as expressed in the 
self-assessed rental value of housing.  This is the mean tax rate in the neighborhood, 
rather than the actual tax rate facing the household.  Although the tax is paid exclusively 
by owners, it is likely that the cost of taxes is passed through to renters, as well.  
Wealthier households are willing to pay more to live in an area with higher mean tax 
rates, as are owners.  In principle, areas with more owners will have a higher mean tax 
rate than areas with a larger proportion of renters, since the latter pay zero taxes.  This 
result does not reflect the value of living in an area with many owners relative to an area 
with many renters, since we control for the proportion of owners in the first stage – so the   24
results presented here more properly reflect the self-assessed value of tax payments 
specifically.   
Table 3.3 presents the results of regressions on the value of the characteristics of 
the neighborhood as reflected in the attitudes of neighbors.  Although on average, none of 
these attributes is significantly related to the rental price of a dwelling, there is 
considerable variation across households.  Scheduled caste households are willing to pay 
less than average for both criminal safety and a clean environment.  Older household 
heads will pay more, as will households with educated heads, and owners. In particular, 
households where the head has high school or higher education are willing to pay Rs. 149 
for safety and Rs. 131 for a cleaner environment.   
These results suggest that the benefits of improvements in municipal public 
services and amenities generally accrue to wealthier households.  This is true, in terms of 
absolute value.  But if we express the value of the services in terms of the rental value of 
the dwelling (or of income – the results are consistent), we see that the relative 
distribution of public services is pro-poor and pro-scheduled caste.  Table 4 presents the 
value of the simulated improvement in services as a percentage of self-assessed rent.   
The first two columns of Table 4 compare the relative benefits of these simulated 
interventions across wealth class.  In all cases, the relative benefits to the poorest quartile 
are greater than those accruing to the wealthiest quartile.  A connection to the mains 
water is four times more valuable to the poor; sewers, distance to bus, safety, air 
pollution, are all worth twice as much to the poor.   
The second two columns compare scheduled-caste and non-scheduled caste 
households.  Here the distinction is not so great, but these untargeted interventions seem   25
to benefit scheduled-caste households more than non-scheduled caste households.  The 
third pair of columns compares the relative benefits accruing to native-born and 
immigrant households; there is little difference between the two.
14     
The final pair of columns compares the returns to households that own their 
dwellings with those that do not own their dwellings.  Ownership in Pune can be de facto 
as well as de jure, and does not necessarily imply possession of legally sanctioned title.  
Ownership is therefore not strictly correlated with income or even wealth.  Many poor 
households, including those in slums, own their dwellings, whereas many middle-class 
households rent flats.  These columns show little differences between owners and renters, 
with two exceptions.  The first is that owners value mains water connection more than 
renters.  The second is that owners are willing to pay more than renters to live in areas 
with higher average tax rates, and that this increase is not entirely passed through to 
renters.  This makes sense, since it is owners who benefit from capitalization, whereas 
both owners and renters benefit from the provision of public services.   
 
6. Discussion 
The main objective of our paper is to estimate the demand for public services and 
amenities, and examine if and how demand for specific services varies across groups of 
households. For example, is the demand for networked or piped water and sewerage 
higher for poorer households? Or are safety from crime and violence and air quality more 
important for the highly educated? Understanding local demand and preferences is 
important as the provision of public services and amenities should reflect local 
                                                 
14 Roughly 1/3 of households in the sample are scheduled caste, and 2/3 are native to Pune.   26
preferences and local governments need to prioritize public expenditures in times of 
fiscal stress. 
To examine heterogeneous demand for public services, we estimate a non-
parametric hedonic function and allow the structural demand parameters to vary with 
household characteristics.  The value of public services and other dwelling unit attributes 
are recovered non-parametrically, without resorting to restrictive functional forms.  In 
fact, linear or even systematically (e.g., logarithmic or exponentiated) parametric 
nonlinear forms may be significantly biased: the χ2 test of linearity in parameters is 
rejected in100 percent of the bootstrapped samples. For robustness, we re-ran the 
regressions and simulations in OLS (results available).  The OLS first-stage regression 
had consistently smaller – and most likely underestimated – standard errors.  Conversely, 
because we do not impose parametric restrictions on the 1
st stage, we achieved a much 
better fit in the 3
rd-stage regressions using the GAM estimates.  The OLS 3
rd-stage 
parameter estimates were on average one-third smaller than the GAM estimates, and a 
quarter of them also had different signs.   
Housing stock comprises large fraction of wealth, and housing services are a 
substantial part of consumption.  Households place great value on certain attributes: 
living space, public services, housing quality, neighborhood attributes, and so on.  The 
value of these attributes differs significantly among households, by wealth, education, 
social status (caste), and other characteristics.  Although wealthier households receive a 
greater share of value of public services (water, transport, education, safety), poorer 
households also benefit.  And when expressed in terms of the price of housing or income, 
the value of publicly-provided services accruing to the poor is greater than that going to   27
wealthier households.  The services examined here are worth roughly 29 percent of the 
rental value of the dwelling among the wealthy, but 67 percent of the rental value among 
the poor.  The list of services examined here is clearly not comprehensive – wealthier 
households may benefit from different public services that we have not included.  But the 
results suggest that even untargeted, across-the-board investment in these services can be 
progressive. 
The methodology used here can be applied broadly to examine the demand for 
housing and public services across cities. While the analysis here is limited to short-term 
capitalization effects where residential capital and households are relatively immobile, it 
will be useful to extend this approach to evaluate long-term implications of service 
delivery failures when both households and capital can move to alternate locations in 
response to supply side failures. This would provide complementary evidence to 
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1 0.129 (0.04) ** 161.519 (53.84)
Sewer
1 0.062 (0.05) 76.061 (64.81)
Distance to bus
2 -0.006 (0.00) + -61.260 (31.89)
Neighborhood characteristics
2
  Parks within 1 km 0.000 (0.00) -4.519 (18.38)
Schools within 1 km 0.005 (0.00) * 122.223 (81.00)
Property tax rate (%) 0.028 (0.04) 29.056 (43.67)
Neighbor attitudes
2
Share who feel neighborhood is safe 0.198 (0.13) 260.492 (193.10)




3 Standard error in parentheses; + <= 10%, *<=5%, **<=1%.
4 Implicit value based on partial derivative of hedonic for continuous variables
5 Implicit value based on discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables
6 2703 households; bootstrapped 250 times.
7 Mean of Chi-squared tests of nonlinearity in parameters (60.02 df) = 253.86, p < .001.
Dependent variable: log of estimated 
monthly rental value
First stage hedonic 
estimates
3
Implicit mean value of 
attribute (Rupees)
3,4,5
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1 161.52 161.52 100.00 1.00
Sewer
1 76.06 76.06 100.00 1.00
Distance to bus stop
2 -61.26 23.48 -39.70 -2.81
Neighborhood characteristics
2
Number of parks within 1 km -4.52 -4.19 101.48 12.73
Number of schools within 1 km 122.22 68.19 54.44 5.02
Property tax rate (%) 29.06 11.17 39.38 0.27
Neighbor attitudes
2
Share who feel neighborhood is safe 260.49 29.32 11.18 0.09
Share who feel air is polluted -227.67 16.21 -7.12 -0.06
1 Dummy variable, change from 0 to 1.
2 Continuous variables, change of 1/2 of one standard deviation around the mean.
Dependent variable: log of estimated 
monthly rental value (Rupees)
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Table 3.1.  Willingness to pay for dwelling unit attributes
V a l u eS E V a l u eS E V a l u eS E
Scheduled caste -9.86 (5.13) + 0.31 (1.99) -6.89 (4.21)
HH head age  0.61 (0.19) ** 0.06 (0.07) 0.79 (0.16) **
HH head higher educ 4.48 (7.30) 10.15 (2.33) ** 26.84 (5.83) **
HH size -0.09 (1.20) -0.30 (0.47) 1.14 (0.98)
HH head born in Pune 13.96 (5.18) ** 4.35 (2.08) * 0.03 (4.31)
Years in dwelling 0.44 (0.10) ** 0.18 (0.04) ** -0.14 (0.08) +
Income from durables
3 0.43 (0.20) * 0.16 (0.08) + 1.74 (0.15) **
Household owns dwelling 80.70 (3.67) ** -4.84 (2.00) * 13.58 (4.37) **
1 Change from 0 to 1.
2 Change of 1/2 of one standard deviation around the mean.
3 x 1000 Rupees.
Table 3.2.  Willingness to pay for neighborhood attributes
V a l u eS E V a l u eS E V a l u eS E
Scheduled caste 1.22 (2.61) -35.13 (15.68) * -5.32 (3.36)
HH head age  -0.03 (0.10) 2.84 (0.58) ** 0.27 (0.12) *
HH head higher educ 0.28 (3.62) 85.32 (21.73) ** 10.31 (4.67) *
HH size -0.14 (0.61) -3.41 (3.64) 0.44 (0.78)
HH head born in Pune 1.14 (2.67) 15.61 (16.04) -0.42 (3.44)
Years in dwelling 0.01 (0.05) 1.59 (0.29) ** -0.13 (0.06) *
Income from durables
2 -0.09 (0.09) 4.87 (0.56) ** 0.81 (0.12) **
Household owns dwelling -1.42 (2.71) -15.70 (16.26) 12.87 (3.49) **
1 Change of 1/2 of one standard deviation around the mean.
2 x 1000 Rupees.
Table 3.3.  Willingness to pay for neighbor attitudes
Value SE Value SE
Scheduled caste -49.92 (17.22) ** -47.25 (18.52) *
HH head age  4.22 (0.64) ** 3.69 (0.68) **
HH head higher educ 148.86 (23.82) ** 131.03 (25.67) **
HH size -2.66 (4.00) -3.03 (4.31)
HH head born in Pune 12.58 (17.63) 6.31 (18.96)
Years in dwelling 0.25 (0.32) -0.06 (0.35)
Income from durables
2 9.69 (0.61) ** 8.00 (0.66) **
Household owns dwelling 48.42 (17.85) ** 48.04 (19.20) *
1 Change of 1/2 of one standard deviation around the mean.
2 x 1000 Rupees.
Dependent variable: value of improvement
1 in
Share who feel area is 
safe
Share who feel air is 
polluted
Dependent variable: value of improvement
1 in
Number of parks 
within 1 km
Number of schools 
w/in 1 km
Mean neighborhood 
property tax rate (%)
Dependent variable: value of improvement in
Mains water
1 Sewer
1 Distance to bus
2
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Mains water 12.00 2.84 7.63 4.32 5.40 4.43 5.82 2.80
Sewer 0.81 0.30 0.61 0.36 0.52 0.22 0.35 0.67
Distance to bus stop 5.64 2.42 3.95 2.87 3.07 3.20 3.20 2.83
Neighbourhood characteristics
Parks within 1 km -0.15 -0.10 -0.08 -0.11 -0.08 -0.14 -0.12 -0.05
Schools within 1 km 17.69 7.21 11.82 9.01 10.15 8.67 9.12 11.39
Property tax rate (%) 2.18 1.05 1.47 1.21 1.24 1.34 1.40 0.86
Neighbour attitudes
Neighborhood safe 26.40 12.47 18.29 14.53 15.54 15.10 15.59 14.80
Air severely polluted 21.58 10.43 14.74 12.16 12.74 12.75 13.01 11.91
Value of simulation 69.39 28.52 47.03 34.90 38.67 35.70 38.22 36.09
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Appendix Table 1A.  Descriptive statistics for households             
    
Non-scheduled 
caste   Scheduled  caste    
      Mean SE      Mean  SE    
Log of estimated rental value of dwelling  7.26 (1.01)    6.74  (0.84)    
1  HH head age   49.82 (13.36)    46.92  (12.29)    
2  HH head has higher education
1  0.20 (0.40)    0.08  (0.27)    
3 HH  size  4.89 (2.11)    5.30  (2.00)    
4  HH head born in Pune
1  0.61 (0.49)    0.65  (0.48)    
5 Years  in  dwelling  26.77 (25.73)    30.28  (26.89)    
6 Income  from  durables
2  10.63 (16.37)    4.76 (7.88)    
7 Household  owns  dwelling  0.70 (0.46)    0.72  (0.45)    
   N  1732        971       
1  Dummy variables.              
2  Income from durable goods * 1000 Rupees.            
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Appendix Table 1B.  Descriptive statistics for housing                
        
      Mean SE     






Log of estimated rental value of dwelling  7.07 (0.98)           
Own dwelling characteristics              
1 Mains  water
1  0.56 (0.50)    161.52  (53.84)  161.52  
2 Sewer
1  0.78 (0.41)    76.06  (64.81)  76.06  
3 House 
1  0.10  (0.30)   10.91  (87.85)  10.91  
4 Attached 
1  0.71  (0.45)   -191.30  (55.05)  -191.30  
5 Living  space
2  417.41  (441.12)   1208.71 (208.77)  706.09  
6 Good  roof 
1  0.39  (0.49)   204.94  (71.66)  204.94  
7 Good  exterior
1   0.40  (0.49)   416.46  (72.70)  416.46  
8 Distance  to  bus
2  7.33  (5.65)   -61.26  (31.89)  23.48  
9 Slum
1  0.33  (0.47)   -317.05  (41.16)  -317.05  
Neighborhood characteristics
2              
10 Share  houses  0.09  (0.10)   18.17  (47.99)  10.02  
11 Share  attached  0.72  (0.21)   -107.20 (185.61)  -15.71  
12  Mean living space  309.18  (103.89)   -90.95 (249.83)  -15.93  
13  Share with good roof  0.38  (0.22)   -78.59 (143.90)  -22.99  
14  Share with good exterior  0.39  (0.19)   294.13 (161.42)  70.70  
15 Share  slum  0.34  (0.30)   116.11  (67.93)  51.80  
16  Parks within 1 km  13.73  (25.73)   -4.52  (18.38)  -4.19  
17  Schools within 1 km  9.00  (10.01)   122.22  (81.00)  68.19  
18  Mean property tax rate (percent)  0.70  (0.52)   29.06  (43.67)  11.17  
19  Residential density (1000 units/ha)  3.58  (3.70)   25.64  (29.56)  13.32  
Neighbor characteristics
2              
20  Share scheduled caste  0.37  (0.17)   -142.69  (83.06)  -32.09  
21  Mean years in dwelling  20.32  (10.87)   188.05 (106.63)  51.58  
22  Share hh heads with higher educ  0.15  (0.16)   136.30  (83.61)  80.22  
23  Mean durables income
3  4.29  (2.47)   88.85 (161.40)  28.89  
24  Mean log deviation durables  0.63  (0.22)   43.46 (101.79)  7.52  
25 Share  owners  0.71  (0.19)   -310.73 (188.85)  -42.23  
26  Share who feel neighborhood is safe  0.77  (0.18)   260.49 (193.10)  29.32  
27  Share who feel air pollution is severe  0.86  (0.13)   -227.67 (339.58)  16.21  
              
   N  2703                   
1  Dummy variables.             
2  Continuous variables.             
3  Income from durable goods * 1000 Rupees.           
4 
For dummy variables, the value of a change from 0 to 1; for continuous variables, the value of a one-half standard deviation 
change around the mean.   37










1 -0.177 (0.06) **
5 Living space
2 0.001 (0.00) **
6 Good roof 
1 0.160 (0.05) **
7 Good exterior
1  0.303 (0.04) **
8 Distance to bus
2 -0.006 (0.00) +
9 Slum
1 -0.314 (0.05) **
Neighborhood characteristics
2
10 Share houses 0.099 (0.26)
11 Share attached -0.102 (0.18)
12 Mean living space 0.000 (0.00)
13 Share with good roof -0.104 (0.19)
14 Share with good exterior 0.388 (0.18) *
15 Share slum 0.291 (0.13) *
16 Parks within 1 km 0.000 (0.00)
17 Schools within 1 km 0.005 (0.00) *
18 Mean property tax rate (percent) 0.028 (0.04)
19 Residential density (1000 units/ha) 0.004 (0.01)
Neighbor characteristics
2
20 Share scheduled caste -0.271 (0.15) +
21 Mean years in dwelling 0.006 (0.00) *
22 Share hh heads with higher educ 0.367 (0.18) *
23 Mean durables income
3 0.010 (0.02)
24 Mean log deviation durables 0.040 (0.09)
25 Share owners -0.279 (0.14) +
26 Share who feel neighborhood is safe 0.198 (0.13)




3 Income from durable goods * 1000 Rupees.
4 Standard error in parentheses; + <= 10%, *<=5%, **<=1%.
5 2703 households; bootstrapped 250 times.
6 Mean of Chi-squared tests of nonlinearity in parameters (60.02 df) = 253.86, p < .001.
Dependent variable: log of estimated 
monthly rental value First stage hedonic estimates
4
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Appendix Table 3.  3rd-stage results
Demand for dwelling unit 
characteristic
Residual -0.048 0.000 0.090 -0.002 -0.038 0.001 0.004 0.027 -0.039
(17.22) (0.64) (23.82) + (4.00) (17.63) (0.32) (0.61) ** (17.85) (38.52)
Mains water
1 -9.865 0.608 4.477 -0.088 13.959 0.439 0.428 80.701 -304.759
(5.13) + (0.19) ** (7.30) (1.20) (5.18) ** (0.10) ** (0.20) * (3.67) ** (31.27) **
Sewer
1 0.307 0.060 10.152 -0.304 4.354 0.185 0.160 -4.838 59.662
(1.99) (0.07) (2.33) ** (0.47) (2.08) * (0.04) ** (0.08) + (2.00) * (29.97) *
House
1 -0.296 0.020 0.170 -0.025 0.156 -0.003 0.020 0.483 -356.593
(0.17) + (0.01) ** (0.24) (0.04) (0.17) (0.00) (0.01) ** (0.17) ** (40.05) **
Attached -16.597 0.844 41.403 -3.264 -1.286 -0.738 1.186 4.898 186.507
(3.78) ** (0.15) ** (7.51) ** (0.98) ** (4.15) (0.09) ** (0.18) ** (4.05) (31.13) **
Living space -257.771 41.389 684.236 87.655 13.161 0.430 120.092 528.680 -2685.806
(274.14) (10.14) ** (379.58) + (63.62) (280.46) (5.16) (9.75) ** (284.10) + (613.09) **
Good roof 
1 -24.503 0.861 58.171 -3.443 -3.302 -0.840 1.751 18.893 -140.442
(5.00) ** (0.20) ** (9.08) ** (1.27) ** (5.59) (0.11) ** (0.26) ** (5.16) ** (29.44) **
Good exterior
1  -1.350 0.698 77.870 -3.425 -1.956 -0.671 1.939 32.646 -171.689
(8.09) (0.30) * (15.44) ** (1.92) + (8.39) (0.16) ** (0.35) ** (7.49) ** (28.21) **
Distance to bus -6.889 0.794 26.843 1.143 0.030 -0.140 1.737 13.582 -5.492
(4.21) (0.16) ** (5.83) ** (0.98) (4.31) (0.08) + (0.15) ** (4.37) ** (9.43)
Slum
1 62.064 -2.297 -113.813 7.876 -36.978 -0.756 -4.184 121.873 12.325
(10.15) ** (0.41) ** (13.01) ** (2.50) ** (10.93) ** (0.22) ** (0.67) ** (9.35) ** (30.77)
Share houses -4.340 0.374 11.633 -0.054 1.267 -0.134 0.949 4.466 -8.572
(5.00) (0.18) * (6.92) + (1.16) (5.12) (0.09) (0.18) ** (5.18) (11.19)
Share attached 19.613 -1.103 -30.978 -1.577 -7.916 -0.177 -2.535 -25.588 2.489
(9.34) * (0.34) ** (12.90) * (2.17) (9.56) (0.18) (0.33) ** (9.68) ** (20.88)
Mean living space 20.588 -1.858 -74.268 2.846 -1.442 0.200 -3.665 -17.976 28.385
(15.90) (0.59) ** (22.04) ** (3.69) (16.27) (0.30) (0.57) ** (16.48) (35.58)
Share with good roof 18.829 -1.829 -70.677 3.355 3.221 0.277 -3.821 -14.206 30.734
(10.94) + (0.40) ** (15.12) ** (2.54) (11.19) (0.20) (0.39) ** (11.35) (24.46)
Share with good exterior -53.861 6.041 234.942 -10.976 -12.421 -0.831 13.878 60.478 -92.262
(24.45) * (0.90) ** (33.79) ** (5.67) + (25.00) (0.46) + (0.87) ** (25.33) * (54.68) +
Share slum 1.584 0.495 19.788 4.596 -12.119 -0.637 2.750 58.657 26.077
(8.84) (0.33) (12.20) (2.05) * (9.04) (0.17) ** (0.31) ** (9.16) ** (19.79)
Parks within 1 km 1.215 -0.025 0.283 -0.140 1.137 0.010 -0.092 -1.424 -2.365
(2.61) (0.10) (3.62) (0.61) (2.67) (0.05) (0.09) (2.71) (5.83)
Schools within 1 km -35.126 2.837 85.319 -3.414 15.613 1.588 4.875 -15.701 -84.956
(17.22) * (0.64) ** (23.82) ** (4.00) (17.63) (0.32) ** (0.61) ** (17.85) (38.52) *
Mean property tax rate (%) -5.323 0.267 10.311 0.444 -0.418 -0.126 0.811 12.873 1.961
(3.36) (0.12) * (4.67) * (0.78) (3.44) (0.06) * (0.12) ** (3.49) ** (7.52)
Residential density (1000 units/ha) -6.621 0.356 15.285 0.076 5.109 0.086 0.595 7.481 -8.306
(3.04) * (0.11) ** (4.21) ** (0.71) (3.11) + (0.06) (0.11) ** (3.15) * (6.81)
Share scheduled caste 6.476 -1.192 -30.262 -3.911 -4.213 0.036 -4.049 -28.366 -5.949
(8.76) (0.32) ** (12.12) * (2.04) + (8.97) (0.16) (0.31) ** (9.09) ** (19.62)
Mean years in dwelling -44.876 2.779 90.962 0.176 21.666 1.695 5.755 7.271 -62.820
(13.96) ** (0.52) ** (19.32) ** (3.24) (14.27) (0.26) ** (0.50) ** (14.46) (31.18) *
Share hh heads with higher educ -44.688 3.960 183.619 -13.151 -3.180 -0.427 7.871 28.028 -76.030
(17.90) * (0.66) ** (24.78) ** (4.15) ** (18.30) (0.34) (0.64) ** (18.57) (40.05) +
Mean durables income -24.238 2.172 101.002 -4.358 -1.379 -0.026 4.311 14.184 -46.613
(16.20) (0.60) ** (22.49) ** (3.77) (16.58) (0.31) (0.58) ** (16.79) (36.23)
Mean log deviation durables -7.442 0.647 21.866 0.123 0.414 -0.025 1.862 9.392 -11.491
(6.01) (0.22) ** (8.33) ** (1.40) (6.15) (0.11) (0.21) ** (6.23) (13.45)
Share owners 66.163 -4.355 -184.213 3.488 -8.445 1.095 -9.617 -115.870 28.569
(16.50) ** (0.61) ** (22.83) ** (3.84) (16.90) (0.31) ** (0.59) ** (17.10) ** (36.97)
Share who feel neighborhood is safe -49.925 4.216 148.859 -2.662 12.576 0.255 9.690 48.419 -70.213
(17.22) ** (0.64) ** (23.82) ** (4.00) (17.63) (0.32) (0.61) ** (17.85) ** (38.52) +
Share who feel air pollution is severe -47.252 3.692 131.034 -3.032 6.307 -0.055 7.996 48.036 -45.710
(18.52) * (0.68) ** (25.67) ** (4.31) (18.96) (0.35) (0.66) ** (19.20) * (41.41)
Explanatory variables
Scheduled 
caste HH head age 
HH head 
higher educ HH size Intercept
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